Abstract
Introduction
This commentary on the Statute of the International Court of Justice (Statute) represents neither the fi rst multi-contributor commentary of its kind in international law -this Germanic peculiarity in legal literature has some antecedents, most famously Bruno Simma's commentary on the UN Charter 1 -nor the fi rst large-volume treatment of the Court's procedural law, vide Rosenne's The Law and Practice of the International Court , now in its fourth edition.
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This commentary, however, is unique in the sense that it sets out to be all things to all people: it is intended to be both substantively exhaustive whilst remaining relatively ' slim ' (at nearly 1,600 pages); it discusses the Statute article by article and yet tries not to succumb to a narrow Begriffsjurisprudenz -like literalist interpretation of each article in isolation; it is international and yet the majority of the contributors were recruited from the small, well-known group of scholars closely connected to the Court. How does it fare in the eyes of the beholder -and which criteria should be used to determine how such a book ' fares ' ?
When a massive undertaking such as the tome under review here is concluded, the critics inevitably focus on this or that detail and seek to show, in effect, that this or that detail is symptomatic of the project as a whole. The work is judged by how well the contributors have done. We would argue that in large-volume commentaries or encyclopaedias the tasks of the editor(s) -as person(s) ostensibly responsible for and representing the whole -are formal, rather than substantive. Their job is to ensure that they choose their contributors wisely. They seek to make the contributions coherent and readable while not losing sight of each scholar's distinctive traits. That is their real responsibility; they ought to suffer as little for their authors' ' idiosyncrasies ' as journal editors do. The responsibility of individual authors, however, is not for the whole either. It is their duty to write the best possible text within the confi nes placed upon them by the editor(s); it is their duty to effect a modicum of integration with the other texts and with the project as a whole. But, ultimately, each text must be able to stand on its own, especially if a commentary assumes monograph size, as Pellet's treatise on Article 38 does (at 677 -792). Thus, the fi rst section of this essay will discuss the formal editorial issues and the following sections will examine a selection of important topics included in the more than 80 contributions to the volume to show how the authors have portrayed the complex doctrine and jurisprudence of the world's most important tribunal.
The Editors' Work
The choice of contributors may very well be the editors' most important task, for -despite citation guides, informal and formal contracts on the content of a contribution and the copy-editing process -the editors of a collective work in effect have very little infl uence on the outcome once a colleague is entrusted with the task of writing a contribution. It is this choice which largely determines the quality and representative character of a commentary. Zimmermann, Tomuschat and Oellers-Frahm managed to internationalize the authorship; the majority (28 out of 49) are not German or Austrian scholars. In addition, the authors are not exclusively established and world-renowned specialist international lawyers. There is also a signifi cant proportion of younger scholars. Our impression is that the list of contributors is representative and well-balanced.
Three smaller points are linked to the work's material sources. First, a general problem suffered by a commentary which depends on jurisprudence is that it can quite easily become dated by a surprising change in the Court's views. Cases decided after publication clearly cannot be included. The choice of the editors of the third edition of the Max Planck Encyclopaedia of Public International Law to offer both an electronic and a printed version, and to ask contributors to agree to update their contributions over a certain period after the initial publication, may be the way forward in light of the increased amount of jurisprudence produced by international tribunals in recent years.
Second, we could not discern a system in the choice of books for the Commentary's general bibliography (xvi -xvii). Not only were non-specifi c monographs taken on board (e.g. Kelsen's Law of the United Nations ), 3 but also some very specifi c papers that may only be relevant to specifi c topics (for instance, an article by Spiermann, ' Who Attempts Too Much ' , particularly given that he subsequently published a monograph dealing much more broadly with the same topic). 4 Third, there appears at times to be a predilection for quoting the provisions of texts, especially of previous versions of the Rules of Court but sometimes also of authors, merely for the sake of quotation. Examples of this tendency include the commentaries on Article 34 (at 552, 554 -556), Article 62 (at 1333, 1342 -1343, 1366 -1368) , and Article 63 (at 1371 -1372, 1383, 1386 -1387, 1391 ). Although we would expect no less of a work of reference in terms of thoroughness, even a work of this nature would benefi t from less reliance on lengthy quotations of provisions and greater use of references to provisions in footnotes.
Tomuschat on Jurisdiction (Article 36)
Jurisdiction, within the international community, leads a troubled existence. Uncontroversial, undoubted, though no longer unlimited, as to a state's jurisdiction over natural and legal persons and property within its territory, controversies abound regarding its extension extra-territorially as well as its establishment internationally. Crucial to a proper understanding of the Court's jurisdiction is the prerequisite in international law of a manifestation of consent on the part of those states parties to a dispute brought before the Court for settlement. One is left, after reading Christian Tomuschat's commentary, with a somewhat sketchy idea as to why exactly consent is required in the fi rst place. Although the answer to this question may be gleaned from references here and there to positive law and case-law, we would have expected a discussion of the concept of sovereignty and the ways in which it permeates international 3 H. Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations (1950). law in general and restrains the possibilities of international adjudication in particular. In our opinion, it is the traditional notion of the sovereignty of states as denial of the existence of any higher authority over them 5 that accounts for ' [t] he absolute freedom of States either to accept or to reject judicial settlement ' that would ' appear to be anachronistic in the world of today where so many supranational regimes have come into existence ' (at 602 -603). But compliance with judgments of the Court would be abysmal ' [i]f States were forced under the jurisdiction of the Court ' (at 603), which explains why ' developments should take place cautiously, step by step ' (at 603).
All the more surprising then, at least to us, is Tomuschat's suggestion that ' there seems to be no serious reason militating against decisions of the Security Council that would enjoin States confronting one another about issues affecting international peace and security, to bring their disputes before the Court ' (at 617). Tomuschat is, naturally, fully aware that the Court has held, in respect of the phrase ' all matters specially provi ded for in the Charter of the United Nations ' featuring in Article 36(1) of the Statute, that ' the United Nations Charter contains no specifi c provision of itself conferring compulsory jurisdiction on the Court ' . 6 Yet he argues that Article 36(3) of the Charter -allowing the Security Council to recommend to parties referral of their dispute to the Court 7 -does not prejudice the powers of the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter. His inspiration appears to lie with his assessment that such a mode of settlement would be ' infi nitely more appropriate than a decision of the Security Council making binding determinations ' (at 617), supplemented by his comment that the settlement of the Iraq-Kuwait war by way of Security Council Resolution 687 (1991) ' went extremely far ' (at 617, fn. 154).
In his desire to counteract apparently far-reaching Security Council action, Tomuschat fails to appreciate that he must necessarily rely on the same extensive, some would say excessive, reading of the powers of the Security Council that gave rise to its action in relation to Iraq. In essence, he will either have to interpret Article 41 of the Charter extensively, or claim the existence of an implied power along the lines of the Court's broad acceptance in the Reparation opinion, 8 has by now even paved the way for general norm-creation by the Council that could arguably be called ' legislation ' .
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Even though Tomuschat might therefore be right, in principle, that settlement by the Court would be more appropriate than settlement through binding determination by the Council -a political rather than legal claim -his remedy is worse than the disease. It will allow the Security Council to go yet another mile where it already has gone so many. Surely the permanent members of the Council will cheer Tomuschat's suggestion: with only four more votes they could impose (compulsory) jurisdiction on the rest of the world, and strengthen their exceptionalist position by refusing subordination to such jurisdiction for themselves.
Another noteworthy consideration of sovereignty as a guiding concept in matters of jurisdiction lies with the doctrine expounded in the Monetary Gold case, where the Court refused to render a judgment deciding a dispute between the UK and Italy because to do so would be to rule, necessarily and inevitably, on a dispute between Italy and Albania.
11
This doctrine of the ' indispensable (third) party ' , well settled in the Court's jurisprudence (at 603 -607), though somewhat variable in terms of application, is based on the maxim nemo dat quod non habet : states that have consented to the Court's jurisdiction cannot authorize it to rule on the legal position of a state not before the Court.
An interesting question arises whether the doctrine would apply to the settlement of disputes with international organizations, regarding which the requirement of consent applies mutatis mutandis . On this score, Tomuschat argues that the doctrine can have no application in relation to acts of (other) organs of the United Nations. The short answer as to why not is that the United Nations is not ' a sovereign entity ' and that, as the Court is one of its organs, the United Nations is ' debarred from arguing that no judicial determination on its rights and obligations may be carried out in its absence ' (at 604). An example of this might relate to the conduct of the personnel of a UN peacekeeping operation, where the lawfulness of such conduct constitutes the subject-matter of the case before the court. Since such conduct is attributable to the UN, 12 a determination of unlawfulness by the Court would necessarily imply a fi nding of responsibility of the UN. Furthermore, he claims, given the UN's involvement in many of today's international crises, the Court's judicial function could be seriously damaged by recourse to the doctrine. At this point a reference to Judge Schwebel's dissent in the Lockerbie case would have been opportune. Schwebel quite forcefully argued that the Court cannot decide the legality of a Security Council decision in its absence, considering also that the Court's judgment would not bind the Council in view of Article 59 of the Statute. 12 Of course, Tomuschat's observation appears geared towards the lawfulness of specifi c acts or admissions by UN bodies or agents, rather than the question of the validity of the legal acts of its organs and the possibility of review thereof. 13 On the relationship between the Court and the Council, he bluntly states (at 601): ' The ICJ may not issue orders which contradict binding resolutions of the Security Council. ' How these two viewpoints can be reconciled remains somewhat obscure.
Where a violation of international law by the UN would fl ow directly from a binding decision of the Council, one would expect the Court to be able to ' contradict ' and order cessation of wrongful conduct, restitution and, possibly, guarantees against repetition.
14 Moreover, the interpretation and manner of application of Security Council resolutions will probably not be grasped by the doctrine. However, if the validity of a resolution were challenged, and hence its very existence questioned, 15 the absence of an express power of review of the Court would appear to counsel caution in deciding any such matter in proceedings to which the UN is not a party. In any event, the presumption of validity attaching to UN acts, 16 generally, will most likely prevent such challenges to be raised lightly or entertained by the Court in other than the most serious cases.
Tomuschat, in his commentary, does display a certain tendency to adopt positions without providing analysis or authority. For example, he argues as to the US withdrawal from the Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, ' [s] ince that instrument contains no termination clause, it is doubt ful whether the intended withdrawal will produce the desired effect ' (at 619, fn. 169), but there is no further exploration of why that would be so. On another occasion, he suggests that ' [i]t is well known that the Court shies away from resorting in its case law to the notion of jus cogens , due, in particular, to French resistance to that notion ' (at 606, fn. 77), but that seems quite a striking claim to make without further evidence. These are, however, just quibbles. The breadth of topics discussed, the arguments recounted, and the detailed discussion of case-law, amply make up for such indiscretions.
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On which see again Judge Schwebel's dissent, ibid. , at 73-81. 
Pellet on Sources (Article 38)
What a devilishly diffi cult task it is to write a commentary on Article 38 of the Statute! If one writes too much, one stands accused of having written a monograph on the sources of international law; if one writes too little, one will be called out for not having considered the article's connection to the sources of international law. The editors chose well with Alain Pellet: an exposé on this topic requires someone with his experience and careful attention to detail.
As we see it, the task for a commentary on Article 38 is threefold. First, its strongest emphasis must be placed on a description of the function of Article 38 as the ' applicable law ' clause of the International Court of Justice. Second, the author will be expected to provide a rather more general description of the formal sources of international law. Third, a commentary on what arguably is the most fundamental provision of the Statute must also raise, and have an awareness of, the theoretical problems which Article 38 and the whole notion of sources brings to the fore, both with respect to its more pragmatic function as the ' applicable law ' clause of a tribunal and in relation to the problems associated with the creation of norms (the sources of law). How, then, has Pellet fared in this conceptual minefi eld?
The chapter can rightly be called the ' lead contribution ' 17 in the work as a whole. Not only is the topic singularly important, but Pellet's approach to it is characteristic for the entire book. It therefore seems understandable that such a contribution will take up more space than others; still, 115 pages is quite a handful. Pellet organizes his quasi-monograph as follows: fi rst, he explains the drafting history of the provision (at 680 -693); second, the function of Article 38 as an applicable law clause of the Court (at 693 -735); and third, sources as such (at 735 -792).
Pellet here correctly distinguishes between the two roles of Article 38. On the one hand, Article 38 is ' only ' the applicable law clause ( qua lex arbitri ) of the International Court of Justice; on the other hand, Article 38 is cited simply too often by scholarship as (at least) the epistemological ' fount ' of the formal sources of international law as a whole to be ignored by a commentary. Because traditional scholarship has this (falsely) heightened expectation of Article 38, Pellet has had to consider customary international law (at 748-764), for example, as such rather than as lex arbitri . However, even in doing so he sticks colsely to the Court's use of that source.
Yet the closeness of Pellet's arguments to the ' past practice ' of the Court in these matters (salutary though this may be in a commentary of this sort) has an unwelcome side. For example, he approvingly cites Richard Kearney: ' In short, " Article 38 (1) Despite being subject to legal conditions , positive norm-creation is always a constitutive decision depending on an act of will which cannot be replaced by cognitive processes analysing the particular conditions for law-creation. This, then, is the only slight qualm that one could have with Pellet's contribution: where he touches upon the theoretical aspects of his topic -though we are happy that his contribution contains no shortage of theoretical arguments (e.g. at 700 -704, 714, 762, 767, 769) because Article 38 and its relationship with the formal sources of international law is an inherently theoretical topic -he is a little apodictic and sweeping in the theoretical decisions upon which he bases his doctrinal arguments. This may very well be unavoidable within the framework of a commentary, but at crucial points we would have preferred to be presented with an overview of the theoretical options and their effects on doctrine.
One example of this may be found in Pellet's implicit acceptance of the Court's construction of its role in customary international law-making. This may be the most important aspect of its work, because writers on international law rely to a large degree on tribunal jurisprudence (foremost, of course, the Court's) for their proof of what is international law. Strictly speaking -not taking into account the possibility that international law is a common law where judgments engender general norms -the vast majority of these judicial pronouncements must be references to what the tribunal in question believes to be customary international law on the subject. The judgments serve as evidence of customary international norms and are typically not probed by the writers (judicial pronouncements are taken as probative of customary international law's validity). This means that the process preceding this ' taking ' by scholarship -the process whereby the Court obtains its view of what is customary law -is absolutely crucial for the vast majority of international legal scholarship today. If, as we would argue, the Court's work needs to be questioned more often than is the case, then scholars cannot rely on jurisprudence to the degree they have been doing so far. In this sense, the commentary under review also tends to exhibit this unquestioning attitude.
Kolb on ' General Principles of Procedural Law '
Robert Kolb writes on what is termed ' general principles of procedural law ' ; a sub-species, presumably, of those principles in Article 38(1)(c). The very notion of including a section on these ' principles ' is fraught with theoretical diffi culties, because here we have a commentary on the Statute that seems to rely on something outside the Statute -perhaps even outside positive international law.
The problem with ' general principles ' lies not with their substantive content, but in how their existence is justifi ed, and how the ' source ' is traced. Kolb's commentary cannot be faulted for concentrating on the substance of the principles -and he does so admirably -but he can be faulted for not discussing the theoretical problem, for devoting the introductory pages to a classifi cation (at 794 -799) rather than a justifi cation, for the apodictic assumption of the possibility and of its origin in natural law.
For if we were to trace the outlines of a more critical introduction, one that discusses theory rather than avoids it, what would we fi nd? We would fi nd Kolb arguing that the origin of principles lies in natural law: ' From the objective nature of the judicial function … fl ow a series of imperative rules of procedure ' , but natural law's infl uence has become idea-giving, for he continues that these rules ' are binding on the Court by virtue of the Statute ' (at 798). Yet the fi rst part of the sentence remains revealing: things have an ' objective nature ' which needs only to be discovered by man. Norms, the sentence implies, fl ow from this nature immediately. As they are conceived here, the idea of general principles cannot be conceived outside the natural law context -and hang together with the fate of natural law. On this (orthodox) view, no ' positivist ' international lawyer ought to have false ideas about what he or she is supporting -natural law in yet another guise.
On a positivist reading, what can ' principles ' be other than subjective values imported by scholars under the guise of the absolute, the objective? They can, in essence, be two things: they can be generalizations by legal science of a mass of norms of more specifi c scope of application; or they can be norms of a particularly wide material scope of application -whatever source they may belong to. Principles are, however, not something categorically different to other norms, as Kolb also points out (at 794 -795) .
In all cases, the relationship to the positive treaty norms of the Statute is limited. Kolb uses the term in the sense of a scientifi c generalization when he constructs the principle of procedural equality from a mass of articles from the Charter and Statute (at 800). In this case -if ' principles ' are a scientifi c generalization -he is completely within the bounds of legal science strictly conceived. But one must be careful not to draw legal conclusions from his scientifi c generalizations vulgo principles -they remain constructs of scientists' minds and do not as such have or acquire normative status. Conceived as natural law or as a third formal source of international law, 19 the norms by defi nition come from another legal order than the international treaty law of the Charter and Statute. As such -and even if ' general principles ' and treaty law were coordinated legal sources of the same legal order -they postulate the same claim to be valid and cannot change the procedural treaty norms. Actions or omissions of the Court that comply with the Charter and Statute but violate one of the general procedural principles would by defi nition not be illegal under the Court's procedural law (leaving aside the question of the consequences of ultra vires acts of the Court).
But the problem is compounded (or eased) by the existence of Article 38(1)(c). Whatever the status of ' general principles of law ' as a formal source of international law beyond the applicable law clause of Article 38, 20 its inclusion changes the legal situation. In effect, as Hans Kelsen notes, the result is ' that the Court is authorized to apply a rule which the Court considers to be a general principle of law … which implies an almost unlimited discretion ' . 21 22 The stipulation in Article 38 has resulted in the Court having discretion to create the general principles as it applies them -but does this also hold true for the Court's procedure? An argument could be made that the Court is a creature born of the Charter and Statute -the basis of its procedure is treaty law. On this view, it could be argued that the applicable law clause in Article 38 determines the procedure, which would be exhaustively laid down in the treaty instruments.
23 But this review is not the place for such a discussion. Nevertheless, even if one does not share these doubts, the theoretical problems are real. Kolb's commentary on such a problematic ' source ' should, in our view, have discussed them.
Chinkin on Intervention (Articles 62 and 63)
The critical requirement of consent in establishing the jurisdiction of the Court accounts for its discussion, among others, in the commentaries on the provisions of intervention by Christine Chinkin. The history of intervention before the Court under Article 62 of the Statute is one of failure to provide clear guidance on the exact purpose of intervention, its admissible scope, the legal status obtained and its repercussions for the position of the states already before the Court. Thus controversies have abounded over the requirement of a jurisdictional link, sta tus of party or non-party, and the question of entitlement to appoint a judge ad hoc . Chinkin suggests that the Court ' did not have to face these confl icting views before the Chamber acceded to Nicaragua's 20 Ibid.
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Kelsen, supra note 5 , at 393 (emphasis added). request ' (at 1357). Yet this misconstrues the role played by the Court in all of this, because its rejection of prior requests to intervene resulted precisely from a lack of agreement among the judges on the proper scope of intervention (cf. 1346, 1365) . When the Chamber established to decide certain disputes between El Salvador and Honduras granted Nicaragua permission to intervene in respect of the legal regime in the Gulf of Fonseca, 24 this was possible only by ignoring the contradictions inherent in the Court's case-law.
The case between E1 Salvador and Honduras turned, among others, on the legal status of the Gulf of Fonseca. That Gulf was subject to differing claims by the two states: 'a régime of community, co-ownership or joint sovereignty' or 'condominium' (EI Salvador), or 'a community of interest' generating 'a special legal régime' (Honduras). Nicaragua as the third riparian state claimed an interest of a legal nature, and the Chamber accepted that such interest would be affected by its decision.
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That Chamber judgment, which the Statute considers as rendered by the Court as a whole (Article 27 Statute), constitutes the watershed that might allow for broader use of the provision on intervention, Cutting a number of Gordian knots as to the proper scope of intervention, the Chamber decided that the purpose of intervention is to inform the Court of interests and rights ' in order to ensure that no legal interest may be " affected " without the intervener being heard ' and not to seek ' a judicial pronouncement ' on an intervener's own claims; that the consent of states pursuant to Article 36 establishing the jurisdiction of the Court renders those states parties to the case in the sense of Article 59 and that ' no State may involve itself in the proceedings without the consent of the original parties ' ; that a jurisdictional link between the original parties and the intervener is not required, since the consent of states in becoming parties to the Statute accounts for the exercise of powers by the Court under the Statute; and fi nally that an intervening state does not become a party and hence will not be bound by the eventual judgment of the Court.
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And yet there is something unsatisfying about these fi ndings, however sound the reasoning would appear to be. Not surprisingly, this feeling is occasioned by the relative character of the Court's jurisdiction, based as it is on the consent of the states concerned. If, as the Chamber found, the Gulf of Fonseca constitutes a historic bay subject to the joint sovereignty or joint entitlement of the coastal states, 26 would this not signify that Nicaragua's legal interest formed, at least jointly with the other coastal states, ' the very subject-matter of the decision ' ? And if such were the case, would a non-party status, the intervener not bound but also not able to invoke rights as against the parties, be suffi cient to allow the Court to decide the matter? One would think not and perhaps this might explain the second thoughts two out of fi ve judges of the Chamber expressed in arguing that Nicaragua was nevertheless bound.
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Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador/Honduras) , Application to Intervene, Judgment of 13 September 1990 , ICJ Reports (1990 Ibid. , at 130 -131, 133 -135 (paras 90, 92, 95 -100). 26 Ibid. , at 119 -122 (paras 67-72).
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Ibid. , at 619 -620 (Declaration Judge Oda), and 730 -731 (para. 208) (Separate opinion Judge Torres Bernárdez).
At various points Chinkin comments on the confl ict and required balance between party autonomy and third party interests (at 1359, 1363, 1368) . That confl ict and that balance may well need to be reassessed when the interest of a legal nature of a third state constitutes ' the very subject-matter of the decision ' . In some circumstances such a state might be better off invoking the protection of the doctrine expounded in the Monetary Gold case. If such a state nevertheless requests permission to intervene, it would be fully justifi ed in arguing the necessity of party-status and the consequent right to appoint a judge ad hoc . 28 In putting forward its request, a wouldbe intervener would of course place itself at the mercy of the Court, which will have to decide whether the interest of a legal nature would be ' merely ' affected or would constitute the subject-matter of its future decision.
At the other end of the spectrum of intervention we fi nd a right to intervene under Article 63 of the Statute in respect of the construction of a convention to which the intervening state is a party. The legal status of a state availing itself of this right is relatively straightforward, in that the interpretation provided by the Court will be equally binding. As this is spelled out in the text and the purpose of such intervention is limited to questions of interpretation, the controversies over party or non-party status, and hence over jurisdiction, have largely passed by Article 63. As Chinkin notes, ' the required nexus between the intervener and the parties is supplied by the common membership of the relevant treaty and no other jurisdictional link is required ' (at 1385). Her use of the word ' other ' is not intended to suggest the requirement of a jurisdictional link under the relevant treaty, since she points to the intervention of Cuba, in the Haya de la Torre case, 29 which could not establish any relevant basis of jurisdiction.
A matter exposing some ambiguity concerns the stipulation in Article 63(2) that the interpretation will be equally binding on the intervening state. In this respect Chinkin notes that Article 59 of the Statute only provides for the binding force of a decision in respect of the particular case and that therefore the equally binding interpretation ' must also be limited to the judgment in the case, for it would be illogical for a third party to have a greater commitment under a judgment than the parties ' (at 1391).
Though sensible enough as a matter of logic , at the same time an equally illogical consequence arises when an intervening state has no tangible or concrete interest in the case before the Court. In such a case, which more likely than not would be the normal case, an intervening state would remain free to pursue a different interpretation than that adopted by the Court in all later unrelated cases, i.e. not particular , to the decision at hand. In both situations, the case before the Court and later cases, the binding character of the interpretation given for the intervening state would be devoid of practical application.
Both forms of intervention provided for in the Statute, therefore, require an assessment by a third state as to the merits of an attempted intrusion into a case before the Court. On the one hand, a successful intervention may provide it with an opportunity to infl uence the Court's decision to its advantage. On the other hand, its position in future cases may be compromised if matters do not quite turn out as anticipated. An assessment by third states may thus well be to rely on the effect of Article 59 of the Statute and their potential status as indispensable parties. Certainly, practice since Nicaragua's successful attempt -two requests for permission to intervene, one granted, one denied 30 -does not bode well for the prospects of intervention. A somewhat disturbing feature of the commentaries on intervention is that the references to doctrine would appear not to have been kept up to date: no authors writing on the topic are referred to after 1995 (and sometimes before). Though completeness ought not to be pursued for the sake of completeness alone, we would have expected at least some references, even if not all authors could be considered ' most highly qualifi ed publicists ' . But perhaps this has simply been consequential upon delays in deliveries of contributions by some authors, as a result of which other authors that produced early on in the project's lifespan suffered from the dialectics of progress. Be that as it may, Chinkin's grasp of the legal issues concerned, extensive reference to case-law and sound conclusions make her commentaries a worthwhile read.
Conclusion
Perhaps the worst thing one can say about a book nowadays is that one's emotions are not stirred by it, for we forever demand new thrills, new experiences -yes, we would argue that there is such a thing as an academic adrenaline rush. In these cases, it is quite irrelevant whether the reader is thrilled to fi nd his or her prejudices endorsed or whether they are challenged. But this is not such a book; it cannot be, it does not strive to be. It is the voice of orthodoxy, the voice that writes standard and reference works that has guided the publication. Is it a boring book? No, because it serves a particular purpose. We are to learn from it, we are to complete our knowledge. Its orthodoxy, its volume, its calmness are its capital and we believe that that is a good thing.
But there is a sting, one that arises not so much from the concrete contributions but from the traditional style of international legal scholarship, that cannot be avoided. It is what one might call ' diffi culty avoidance scheme ' . When Robert Kolb writes on general principles, for example, that the principle of the proper administration of justice is one ' of which no legal order can divest itself ' , he envisages it to serve in a problemsolving capacity:
This ubiquity of the principle is essential to its function, which is to perform the task of a fl exible ' fi re-brigade ' which the judge can invoke whenever he feels it necessary, because he fi nds no specifi c rule in the applicable instruments, namely the Statute and the Rules. The avoidance of problems is pragmatic: if one cannot fi nd law, one will supplant one's subjective values for those the law does not have. This is, however, only a pragmatic solution, it cannot change the law -Kolb's ' fi re-brigade ' extinguishes the fi re with ' make-believe water ' . 31 This is the moral of the story from the much-misunderstood Lotus dictum:
32 if one cannot prove a norm, one cannot simply assume a norm's validity, just because it seems convenient or necessary.
In the end, is this book then all things to all people? No, but it is as close as one can get. It is limited, but it has to be. There is no doubt in our minds that this book is a standard work which anyone conducting research on the International Court of Justice will at least have to consult, if not actually cite.
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' You never exactly knew whether there would be a real meal or just a make-believe, it all depended upon Peter's whim: he could eat, really eat, if it was part of a game, but he could not stodge just to feel stodgy, which is what most children like better than anything else; the next best thing being to talk about it. Make-believe was so real to him that during a meal of it you could see him getting rounder. ' J. M. Barrie, Peter Pan (1911) . 
